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The Nine Lives of Article 2(4)
David Wippman*
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter has been declared dead, not
once, but many times. In effect, it has died early and often, yet
each time it somehow lives on only to be declared dead yet again
by a new set of self-styled pragmatists wielding old arguments
spiced up with new terminology and new examples of Article
2(4)'s demise.' And each time a new contrarian commentator
marshals the most recent evidence to present at the grave site, a
chorus of the faithful tears up the death certificate and
pronounces the patient alive if not well, reiterating familiar if
updated arguments.
Perhaps the most famous, if not the first, obituary for
Article 2(4) and the UN Charter appeared in the American
Journal of International Law in 1970, in Thomas Franck's
provocatively titled article, "Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or:
Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States."2
Franck's diagnosis was simple: the "high-minded resolve of
Article 2(4)" had failed because the predicted cooperation of the
permanent members of the Security Council never materialized,
because ambiguities in the Charter language afforded ample
opportunity for abuse, because the nature of warfare shifted,
and above all because state practice showed more of breach than
of honor. 3 In an equally famous reply, Louis Henkin responded
* David Wippman, Vice Provost for International Relations, Cornell University, and
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. J.D., Yale Law School, 1982.
1. Article 2(4) reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
2. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809 (1970).
3. See id. at 810-12.
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that the glass was half full, that the Charter norms were batter-
ed but not beaten, that the focus on violations ignored the larger
record of compliance, that the norm influenced state behavior
for the better, and that all governments if not all commentators
continued to recognize its authority.4
The debate has ebbed and flowed over the ensuing years. In
1986, for example, Jean Combacau declared that the interna-
tional system was "back where it was before 1945: in the state of
nature."5 More recently, NATO's 1999 aerial war against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo and the 2003 U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq prompted a new series of articles presenting
again the case for Article 2(4)'s burial. Franck, for example,
concluded that Article 2(4) "has died again, and, this time,
perhaps for good. '6
Early arguments were heavily influenced by realist notions
of international law as epiphenomenal, a product of states
interacting in an anarchic system in which law exerts no
genuine causal influence over state behavior.7  The
contemporary "Emperor's New Clothes perspective,"8 compelled
by an accumulating weight of state practice contrary to the
dictates of the Charter, concedes what realists long claimed,
that powerful states would not allow whatever normative force
the Charter carried to stand in the way of pursuing national
interests by whatever means necessary. 9 Of course, for the real-
ists, Article 2(4) could not die because it never had any inde-
pendent life in the first place. It represented only a temporary
coincidence of interest among powerful states, to be used by
them as convenient and to be ignored, violated or explained
4. Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544, 544 (1971).
5. Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defense in UN. Practice, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9, 32 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
6. Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 620 (2003).
7. For a concise introduction to the "realist challenge," see Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 207-09 (1993).
8. See Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order in the
Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 621 (2003) (characterizing the position of recent
Charter critics who conclude that the 2003 war in Iraq "merely confirmed the long-
evident exhaustion of the United Nations Charter as a source of normative guidance
on the use of force").
9. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAw
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Anthony C. Arend, et al. eds., 1996).
[Vol. 16:2
THE NINE LIVES OF ARTICLE 2(4)
away when inconvenient. When states refrained from using
force in their international relations, they did so not because of
any legal constraint or normative compulsion, but because of
material constraints stemming from considerations of relative
power and interest vis-A-vis other states.
The realist refrain echoes in Franck's seminal 1970 article,
which assigns primary blame for Article 2(4)'s alleged demise to
"a single circumstance: the lack of congruence between the
international legal norm of Article 2(4) and the perceived
national interest of states."10 In conventional realist fashion,
Franck observes that when treaty obligations and national
interest conflict, the latter wins out.1' Thus, he concludes, the
failure of the Charter stems from "the inability of any rule, such
as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to have much control over
the behavior of states."1 2 For an international lawyer, this is a
hard concession.
Franck's 1970 critique of Article 2(4) finds its most notable
modern analogue in Michael Glennon's thoughtful article, "How
International Rules Die."1 3 In a sophisticated updating of
Franck's early arguments, Glennon applies a rational choice
framework that uses the frequency of a rule's violation as the
metric for determining whether the rule remains in effect.' 4 In
this and related work, Glennon concludes that Article 2(4) has
fallen into desuetude as a result of too frequent violations. 5
Glennon is careful to point out that desuetude does not imply
that the norm has no effect on state behavior, only that the
effect is not strong enough to warrant the title of international
law.' 6 In this latter respect, Glennon's essay avoids the full
reach of the realist claim that international law has no causal
force, even as he argues that Article 2(4) is no longer binding.
But the upshot of Glennon's position, and of other
10. Franck, supra note 2, at 835.
11. Id. at 836.
12. Id.
13. Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005).
14. Id. at 940, 946-50. See also Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council
Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16 (2003).
15. Glennon, supra note 13, at 958-60.
16. Glennon, supra note 13, at 960 ("If a rule is breached by a significant
number of states a significant number of times over a significant period of time, I
would not call it international law. It may still exert 'compliance pull' as a social
norm. It may still be regional law-it is entirely possible that different use-of-force
norms hold sway in Europe, say, than in Africa. It may be 'soft law,' whatever that
is. But it is not international law.") (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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contemporary critics, is much the same as the realist view that
international law neither does nor should drive policy makers to
avoid the use of force in pursuit of the national interest. This
view has found its way into the highest echelons of the U.S.
government, where many key positions are occupied by
neoconservatives who favor abandoning treaty obligations
inconsistent with U.S. national interests and regard Article 2(4)
as a paper constraint unsuited to the contemporary strategic
environment and likely, if respected, only to hinder the U.S.
exercise of power. 17 Unlike the pragmatic realists of earlier
administrations, however, the neoconservatives in and outside
the U.S. government have sought to use U.S. power to remake
the world, and in particular the Middle East, with results now
painfully visible in Iraq.
As Glennon points out, whether we regard Article 2(4) as
law or social norm is a semantic and definitional question that
cannot be resolved in the absence of empirical tools that are
simply unavailable.' 8 But the notion that Article 2(4) died in
1970, or in 1986, or in 1999, or in 2003, or that it slowly expired
over the last generation, suggests a linear view of the effect of
violations. Under this view, the norm ultimately collapses
under the accumulated weight of too many and too significant
breaches.
This approach assumes that legal norms operate on a one-
way ratchet, in which violations progressively undermine a
norm with no room for recovery in between violations. In fact,
Article 2(4) has displayed remarkable resilience; it not only
stubbornly refuses to die, but sometimes emerges stronger than
before. Indeed, it was not so long ago that even past and
present mourners concluded, in the wake of the dissolution of
the former Soviet Union and the subsequent new-found though
temporary unanimity of the Security Council, that we were in
fact living in a new world order.' 9 The Council's authorization of
the use of force in the first Gulf War was heralded as proof that
the system was finally working as intended.
Perhaps Article 2(4) emerged like Lazarus from the dead in
1990, only to be killed again by subsequent breaches in Kosovo,
Iraq, and elsewhere. But it seems more likely that rumors of its
17. For a neoconservative take on international hw, see generally ROBERT
KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER (2003).
18. See Glennon, supra note 13, at 952.
19. See Franck, supra note 2, at 609-10.
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death have once again been exaggerated. In fact, Article 2(4)
displays a surprising capacity to endure major setbacks for
several reasons. First, its core-the ban against the invasion,
occupation, and eventual annexation of another state-remains
largely intact. However much the norm may fray through
abusive invocations of self-defense, mis-readings of Security
Council resolutions, or overreaching claims on behalf of regional
organizations, open breaches of the norm remain rare; we are
not in the pre-Charter world of German armies marching
through Europe and Japanese fleets attacking Pearl Harbor.
Second, international law governing force has shown a capacity
for adaptation to changed circumstances. As a quasi-
constitutional instrument, the Charter must flex at the joints to
endure; evolving understandings of the law, to include, for
example, a limited right of anticipatory self-defense, should be
understood as evolution rather than revolution. And third, and
perhaps most important, breaches of the norm tend to be self-
limiting, as the international political system adapts or shifts in
ways that render repeated breaches contrary to the interests of
most states, often including those responsible for the breaches
in the first place.
I. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN
Challenges to the normative authority of Article 2(4) are
many. In the aftermath of any given incident, whether the
conflict over Kosovo or the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the temptation
to declare the cause lost and remove the patient from life
support is understandably powerful. But before signing a death
certificate, we should consider both the baseline against which
we are measuring Article 2(4)'s vital signs and the cyclical
course in which those vital signs rise and fall.
The framers of the UN Charter were pragmatic men,
hardened by the experience of a world war in which entire cities
were obliterated by incendiary and nuclear attack. They
understood that a flat ban on the coercive use of force would not
succeed in eliminating all interstate violence, but undoubtedly
hoped to reduce substantially, if not eliminate entirely, large-
scale international armed conflicts. In this, they largely
succeeded. How much of that success we should attribute to the
law of the Charter and the institutional mechanism it creates to
"enforce" that law, and how much to national interest and the
2007]
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distribution of material resources, will forever be open to debate.
But at a minimum, the Charter framework offers some
normative reinforcement for decisions that might be taken for
many reasons.
Of course, the Charter design has never functioned entirely
as intended. The Charter's enforcement mechanisms require
the support or at least acquiescence of all five permanent
members, something achieved only once during the Cold War
and only sporadically since. No state ever signed an Article 43
agreement placing troops at the Council's disposal. With the
Security Council sidelined throughout most of its history by
Cold War tensions and the veto, and more recently by disputes
over Iraq and the U.S.-declared "global war on terrorism," the
door has stood open for states to act in ways that contravene or
at least undermine the Article 2(4) regime.
In his 1970 article, Franck identifies three principal trends
that, in his view, culminated in the early death of Article 2(4):
"1, the rise of wars of 'national liberation'; 2, the rising threat of
wars of total destruction; 3, the increasing authoritarianism of
regional systems dominated by a super-Power."20 Each of these
trends has been overtaken by historical developments in ways
that render them no longer the threat to Article 2(4) they once
were, though each has a modern analogue that continues to pose
a threat to the Charter norm on the use of force.
A. CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF WAR
The Charter's drafters were in many ways generals fighting
the last war; the Charter regime therefore outlawed aggression,
with German armies marching through Europe the paradigm
case. As Franck points out, the nature of warfare changed in
the post-Charter world, with wars of national liberation and
insurgencies of various stripes becoming the dominant form of
armed conflict. 21 Attempts to identify an aggressor in such
conflicts, and, in particular, to identify an armed attack of the
sort contemplated by Article 51, would have been difficult even
with a well functioning Security Council. In the polarized
climate of the Cold War, such efforts were largely fruitless. In
many cases, each side in a given conflict, and its supporters,
could argue with greater or lesser plausibility that the other
20. Franck, supra note 2, at 835.
21. See id. at 812-20.
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side was the aggressor. External intervention in internal
conflicts became the norm.
Throughout most of the Cold War, most states operated on
the assumption that international law permitted military aid to
an incumbent government, at least when the government could
plausibly claim that such aid was needed to offset external
assistance illicitly given to opposing forces. 22 Conversely, most
states viewed aid to rebel forces as a violation of the principle of
non-intervention, even if the rebels portrayed themselves as
freedom fighters opposing a dictatorial regime. Franck's point in
1970 was that whether external involvement in a given case
constituted legitimate collective self-defense or aggression could
not be determined "[in the absence of some universally credible
fact-determination procedures .... ,,23 Further, all efforts to
arrive at agreed rules dealing with the newly endemic
phenomenon of "indirect and vicarious aggression" proved
fruitless. 24
Franck's point, though well-taken, may not prove as much,
then or now, as the title of his article might suggest. Article 2(4)
does not apply neatly to cases of intervention in internal
conflicts, and there is still no generally agreed means short of a
frequently deadlocked Security Council for authoritative
determination of the facts. Such conflicts are still endemic: so
many states intervened in the recent conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for example, that it was sometimes
referred to as Africa's World War.
But internal conflicts are not as frequent as they were
during the Cold War. More to the point, weakness in the reach,
clarity, and impact of Article 2(4) does not translate into
evidence of its demise. It simply means that the authority of the
norm is variable; plainly, it is stronger in clear cases of classic
inter-state aggression. When Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait,
there was little room for argument, and the Security Council
authorized the use of all necessary means to restore Kuwait's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.25  Even in internal
conflicts, the norm still offers some guidance. The International
22. See Tom J. Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING
RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 319 (L. Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1993).
23. Franck, supra note 2, at 817.
24. Id. at 819.
25. See S.C. Res. 678, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
2007]
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Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia determined that
Serbia's intervention internationalized the conflicts in Bosnia
and Croatia,26 and the International Court of Justice ruled that
Uganda's intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
violated Article 2(4), despite claims of invitation and self-
defense.27
The real complaint amounts to this: force is still used
routinely in international relations, without Security Council
authorization and in situations that do not amount to genuine
self-defense. While force may seldom take the form of open
cross-border aggression, it nonetheless permeates the
international system; therefore, claim the critics, Article 2(4)
has failed. Defenders of Article 2(4) might legitimately accept
the premise of this claim without accepting the conclusion.
Force remains endemic, but open aggression does not, and illicit
interventions remain something to disguise, deny, or excuse.
Differences over the conclusion to be drawn from evidence
on which all agree stem in part from differences in methodology
and perception. As Henkin observed in 1971, the problem with
Franck's diagnosis is that it "judges the vitality of the law by
looking only at its failures."28 The same might be said of
subsequent diagnoses. Glennon, in the modern version of the
argument, contends that we should focus principally on the
law's failures.29 When a rule is violated, we know that the rule
did not cause the behavior sought; conversely, when a rule is
followed, we do not know whether the rule was the cause of
compliance or incidental to it.3° While Glennon's observation is
accurate, his approach stacks the deck by privileging
"disconfirming" evidence, and it neglects the possibility that
whatever ground is lost when a breach occurs might be made up
by subsequent adherence to the norm or by imposition of
reputation and other costs on the violator.
A better test of whether Article 2(4) still lives is whether
state decision-makers continue to accept it as a general
standard of expected conduct powerful enough to constrain state
behavior. In fact, argued Henkin, Article 2(4), despite periodic
26. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, IT 86-87 (July 15,
1999).
27. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
45 I.L.M. 271, at 307-09 (Dec. 19, 2005).
28. Henkin, supra note 4, at 544.
29. See Glennon, supra note 13, at 952-53.
30. See id. at 939, 967.
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breaches, has established itself as a norm and deterred
violations: "[t]he sense that war is not done has taken hold, and
nations more readily find that their interests do not in fact
require the use of force after all."31 Certainly, no government
denies that Article 2(4) remains good law. Violations are not
justified on the ground that the norm is dead; instead, states
invoke self-defense or other legal justification for conduct that
others might view as a breach, or deny the facts that would
support a claim of breach. While Glennon and others dismiss
such statements, in rational choice terms, as "cheap talk,"32 they
ought at least to count as evidence of a general recognition that
inter-state war either is not or should not be done, except in
accordance with the Charter framework. While in a given
context a variety of interests may overpower whatever
constraining force the norm exerts, it does not follow that the
norm is without effect.
Plainly, inter-state wars are less frequent than before 1945.
Whether and to what extent that may be attributed to the
Charter legal regime is unknown and unknowable. Glennon
suggests that while not strong enough to be "law," Article 2(4)
may exercise some constraining force as a social norm.33 But
this enters the realm of irresolvable semantic differences;
Article 2(4) of the Charter is alive, whether as law or as social
norm. Open breaches still occur, bt.t they are infrequent.
Nonetheless, changes in the nature of warfare have again
posed important challenges to the legal regime of the Charter.
The modern analogue to wars of national liberation may be
transnational terrorism. One important consequence has been a
transformation in the definition of what constitutes an armed
attack, with the blurring of the boundaries between state and
non-state actors. In the past, states assumed that only other
states could carry out an armed attack. When Israel bombed
PLO headquarters in Tunisia in 1985, it was widely
condemned, 34 in part because PLO attacks on Israel were not
deemed the equivalent of an armed attack that might justify
31. Henkin, supra note 4, at 544.
32. Glennon, supra note 13, at 977 (citing Stephen M. Walt, Rigor or Rigor
Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1999, 5, at
29).
33. Id. at 963.
34. The United Nations Security Council condemned Israel by a vote of 14-0,
with the United States abstaining. See S.C. Res. 573, para. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573
(Oct. 4, 1985).
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military action against a host state in self-defense. 35 But in
2001, when the United States claimed a right to use force
against Afghanistan, the international community largely
agreed that the events of September 11 amounted to an armed
attack imputable to Afghanistan, even if it could not be shown
that the Taliban government authorized, directed, or approved
the attack. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the collective self-defense
provision under which an attack against one NATO member is
deemed an attack against all. 36 The Organization of American
States (OAS) pledged to support the United States in a
resolution invoking the right of self-defense.37 Similarly, the
Security Council in Resolution 1373 criminalized support for
terrorists and implicitly recognized that a U.S. use of force
against Afghanistan would constitute self-defense. 38 This past
summer 2006, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, following
repeated Hezbollah attacks in Israel. Israel did not view itself
as at war with Lebanon; instead, its forces sought to displace
Hezbollah fighters to make way for the Lebanese army to exert
control over the border region. Yet to attack Hezbollah, in a
world organized by territorial boundaries, necessarily meant
that Israel had to attack Lebanon as well, just as the United
States had to attack Afghanistan in order to pursue Al Qaeda.
This kind of transnational conflict between states and non-state
actors operating from other states places an obvious strain on
the law of self-defense. The problem seems manageable when
confined to cases in which a state harbors a non-state terrorist
group that commits open attacks against another state. The
U.S. claim that it may attack terrorists wherever and whenever
it finds them poses a greater challenge, at least conceptually. 39
35. See S.C. Res. 573, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (condemning
Israeli reprisal against the PLO Headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia as an "act of armed
aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of
the Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct"); see also
Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force,
18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145, 157 (2000).
36. See Statement by the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2001)124
(Sept. 12, 2001), www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
37. Organization of American States, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Sept. 21, 2001,
OEA/Ser.F/II.24.
38. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
39. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security
Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675
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So far, however, that claim has been mostly rhetorical. U.S.
cruise missile strikes against suspected al Qaeda members in
Yemen, Pakistan, and, most recently, Somalia would plainly
violate Article 2(4) if carried out without the consent of the
governments of those states, but the United States seems to
have obtained consent, or at least acquiescence, in each case.
One important reason Article 2(4) remains alive-if not
always well-is that many of the threats to its vitality have
proved to be self-limiting. The wars of national liberation that
concerned Professor Thomas Franck in 1970 have largely run
their course.40 Decolonization is all but over, East Timor's
independence from Indonesia one of the colonial era's last gasps.
The leaders of former national liberation movements, such as
the African National Congress in South Africa or the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, now
run the governments of independent states. External
intervention in civil wars, particularly in failed or failing states,
remains a major problem, but wars of national liberation, one
important source of such conflicts, have now largely died out.
For structural reasons, the risks posed by the U.S. global
war on terrorism may also prove self-limiting. The United
States, whatever its rhetoric about attacking terrorists
wherever it finds them, cannot afford to do so in very many
places without alienating allies or states whose cooperation is
vital in the war on terrorism. Mullah Muhammad Omar may be
alive and well and busily reorganizing the Taliban in Pakistan,
but the United States cannot afford to destabilize the
government of Pervez Musharraf by pressing the issue too
strongly. And with the exception of Israel and its continuing
war against Hezbollah, Hamas, and related groups, other states
have not chosen to emulate the United States in its willingness
to employ military force across borders in the pursuit of terrorist
groups.
B. THE NUCLEAR CHALLENGE AND PREVENTIVE WAR
The second trend cited by Professor Franck in 1970 sounds
(2004). See also Anthony Dworkin, The Yemen Strike: The War on Terror Goes
Global, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Nov. 14, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/
onnews/news-yemen.html.
40. See Franck, supra note 2, at 813-20 (detailing the applicability of Article
4(2) to the wars of national liberation in Lebanon and South Vietnam).
2007]
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remarkably familiar: the increasing tendency of states to invoke
preemptive self-defense in ways that, if accepted, would render
Article 2(4) a dead letter.41 On its face, Article 51 requires an
armed attack to occur as a prerequisite to the exercise of the
right to self-defense. As Franck points out, a rule that requires
a state to await a first strike is intolerable in a nuclear age, but
a rule that "permits a pre-emptive strike whenever a nation
regards itself as 'intolerably threatened' is so subjective as to be
no rule at all."42 But notwithstanding Franck's concern, states
generally have not claimed a right of anticipatory self-defense,
much less (until recently) a right to preventive war. Claims to
exercise such a right have been few and isolated, and reactions
have varied, depending on the circumstances. Thus, Israel's
preemptive strike in the 1967 Six Day War received tacit
acceptance from the United States and many western countries,
which accepted Israel's claim that an attack against it by Arab
states was imminent. By contrast, the Security Council
unanimously condemned Israel's 1981 attack against the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in Osiraq, in large part because no Iraqi attack
on Israel was imminent.43
These and other cases demonstrate less the failure of the
Charter's regime governing the use of force than its capacity to
adapt to changing circumstances. Over time, the Charter could
reasonably be read to permit anticipatory self-defense in the
event of convincing evidence of an imminent attack. For the
Bush administration, however, anticipatory self-defense, with
its continued insistence on evidence of an imminent attack,
might, in a post-9/11 world, still be too little, too late. In its
2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration
claimed the right to engage in preventive military action:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not
seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks
would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use
of weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed,
delivered covertly, and used without warning....
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more
41. Id. at 820.
42. Franck, supra note 2, at 821.
43. S.C. Res. 487, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
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compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
4 4
By substituting a sliding scale of risk assessment for the
imminent attack requirement, the United States effectively
adopted, at least in its public rhetoric, the highly subjective
standard Franck described a generation ago.45  The United
States did not, however, invoke the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense to justify the 2003 war in Iraq. The political rhetoric
prior to the war, which centered on the need to find and destroy
weapons of mass destruction Iraq turned out not to possess,
suggested the war was in fact an early application of the 2002
National Security Strategy.46 The extent to which United States
decision-makers genuinely believed their own rhetoric about the
"gathering danger"47 posed by Iraq remains the subject of
debate; some critics of the war suggest the real motive was a
neoconservative push to transform the politics of the Middle
East through regime change in Iraq.48 Either way, the United
States, in the end, avoided preemptive self-defense and relied
instead on a strained reading of the relevant Security Council
resolutions as its primary legal justification for war.49
To some extent, the United States' choice of legal
justification may have reflected a desire to accommodate allies
such as the United Kingdom and Australia, which wanted a
justification consistent with the UN Charter and palatable to
audiences at home. The United States' legal rationale may also
have reflected the concern, evident in the National Security
Strategy itself,50 that reliance on preemptive self-defense might
44. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, at 15,
Sept. 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. The Bush administration has
expanded upon this theme in subsequent speeches and writings by administration
officials.
45. See Franck, supra note 2, at 821.
46. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sept. 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
47. President George W. Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations
General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.
48. See, e.g., Jonathan Schell, No Doubt, THE NATION, June 30, 2003, at 8.
49. See William H. Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Future Implications of the Iraq
Conflict: Preemption, Iraq and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003)
(describing the origins of the series of Security Council Resolutions upon which the
Bush Administration depended).
50. The National Security Strategy of the United States, available at
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open the door for other states to invoke that doctrine to commit
aggression. Whatever the reason, here, too, the threat to the
Charter appears self-limiting. Given its disastrous post-war
experience in Iraq, the United States' appetite for further
preventive wars is likely to be modest, at best. The United
States has shown little stomach for military action against Iran,
despite that country's long-standing hostility to the United
States and Israel and its recent progress in efforts to develop
nuclear weapons. Similarly, the United States insists that
diplomacy is the best means to deal with North Korea's recent
nuclear test. Indeed, the United States has little choice, since
military action might prompt North Korea to retaliate against
South Korea with a nuclear strike against Seoul. In short, Iraq
may turn out to be the high-water mark in claims of preemptive
self-defense, soon to recede as a threat to the Charter in much
the same way that claims of a right to preemptive self-defense
declined following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
Of course, nuclear weapons remain a major challenge to the
Charter system, even if we no longer fear a massive
thermonuclear exchange. Ironically, though, the proliferation of
nuclear weapons may, in the short run, render violations of the
Charter less likely. At a minimum, it will insulate some states
from open attack, including the two standing members of the
"axis of evil." North Korea already has a potent deterrent
against United States' military action, and Iran may soon have
it, as well. India and Pakistan can no longer afford to engage in
open conflict; like the superpowers during the Cold War, they
cannot risk mutual destruction, and so conflict between them
must be confined to small-scale skirmishing over Kashmir.
While Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would revamp
the balance of power in the Middle East, Iran could not afford to
use a nuclear weapon against Irael, since it might retaliate in
kind. In short, in the near term, proliferation may limit the
ability of force-projecting states, particularly the United States,
to intervene militarily in states viewed as threats, and that, by
itself, may bolster rather than weaken Article 2(4).
In the long run, of course, nuclear proliferation may prove
highly destabilizing to the Charter system and the world. At
present, any country that shares nuclear material or weapons
with a terrorist group runs a substantial risk of detection and
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
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retaliation. But the more countries that acquire nuclear
weapons, the easier it will be for any one of them to disguise the
source of nuclear material shared with a non-state group. And
if regional powers such as Iran acquire nuclear weapons, other
states in the region will experience strong pressures to acquire
such weapons for themselves.51 Whether the Charter regime on
the use of force can continue to survive in such a world is an
open question, but we are not there yet.
III. REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION
In 1970, a major concern was that exceptions to Article
2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force threatened to swallow the
rule. Of particular concern, noted Franck, were the expansive
claims made by regional organizations to enforce the peace
within their regions and discipline members "suspected of
deviation."52 Under the express terms of the Charter, regional
organizations may not carry out enforcement actions absent
prior Security Council authorization, although they may use
measures short of force to maintain peace within the region.53
The two superpower-dominated regional blocs occasionally used
force or subversion to keep members from straying and
sometimes inverted the Charter scheme by taking coercive
measures in response to perceived threats to regional peace,
even in the absence of Security Council authorization. Thus, for
example, the United States placed a naval quarantine around
51. See Noah Feldman, Islam, Terror, and the Second Nuclear Age, N.Y. Times
Magazine, October 29, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/
magazine/29islam.html?ex=1319774400&en=072dOdOae9ef345d&ei=5090&partner=
rssus.
52. Franck, supra note, at 822.
53. Article 53(1) reads:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with
the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in
paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in
regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the
part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request
of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for
preventing further aggression by such a state.
U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1
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Cuba during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and justified its
action on the basis of a "recommendation" from the
Organization of American States.5 4
With the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, much of
the impetus to employ regional organizations in ways
inconsistent with the Charter disappeared. With capitalism
triumphant, the blocs no longer exist as such; much of Eastern
Europe has either joined NATO or is clamoring to do so. But
this same tectonic shift in international politics has opened the
door to two possible new forms of abuse.
The first, presenting perhaps the greatest challenge to
Article 2(4)'s normative authority in recent years, came from an
unlikely source: NATO. 55 NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo
was a collective action by the world's richest and most powerful
states, the states most directly associated with and interested in
the maintenance of the rule of law in international affairs. The
breach of the Charter was clear and apparent. NATO did not
seek or receive Security Council authorization, and it was not
acting in self-defense. Given NATO's membership, the
intervention could not be dismissed as a simple and transient
breach of international law or the aberrant action of a few states
carrying little or no precedential value. Moreover, most NATO
members made relatively little effort to shoehorn the
intervention into the legal categories available under the UN
Charter for the use of force.56 The United States in particular
did not advance a specific legal rationale for the intervention, as
it usually does when it engages in significant military action.
Instead, the United States articulated a series of contextualized
factors that in the United States' view rendered the intervention
"justified."57
In the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention, and in
connection with the drafting of a strategic statement for NATO's
50th anniversary, the United States briefly suggested that
NATO as a regional organization did not need Security Council
authorization to act. 58 In Senate testimony on April 21, 1999,
54. Resolution of Council of the Organization of American States, Oct. 23, 1962,
47 US Department of State Bulletin 722 (1962).
55. The discussion of Kosovo below is drawn from David Wippman, Kosovo and
the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129, 130-131 (2001).
56. See Thomas Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 857, 859(1990).
57. See, e.g., James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing,
Mar. 16, 1999.
58. Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of State, Prepared Statement to
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Assistant Secretary of State Franklin Kramer noted that
"[w]hile collective defense continues to be the core function of
the Alliance, future missions should include 'out-of-area'
contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo, which threaten the
overall strategic stability of Europe." 9 He then added:
As you know, in taking any such NATO action, it is our strong belief
that UN Security Council resolutions mandating or authorizing NATO
efforts are not required as a matter of international law-and, as the
Kosovo situation has shown, that view is widely shared in the Alliance.
NATO's actions have been and will remain consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations-a proposition reflected
in the Washington Treaty itself. The United States will not accept any
statement in the new Strategic Concept that would require a UN
Security Council resolution for NATO to act.60
NATO's action in Kosovo and U.S. post-Kosovo rhetoric
prompted considerable hand-wringing and new claims of Article
2(4)'s demise. But the consternation was surprisingly short-
lived. At the conclusion of the conflict, the UN Security Council
adopted a series of resolutions approving the political settlement
reached between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
suggesting, if not approval, at least after-the-fact acquiescence
in NATO's decision to intervene.61  Moreover, NATO's
intervention did not open the floodgates to other "humanitarian
interventions," nor is NATO eager to act again without a
Security Council imprimatur. The ongoing genocide in Darfur
would be an obvious opportunity for states so inclined to
circumvent the Security Council. But the United States,
overstretched militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, is hardly
likely to lead the charge against another Arab government
absent Security Council authorization and it has shown no
disposition to intervene elsewhere for humanitarian reasons.
Other NATO members are unlikely to conduct their own
humanitarian intervention without U.S. leadership and support,
and most did not endorse the U.S. suggestion that NATO
generally does not need Security Council authorization for
enforcement action. Instead, most NATO states prefer to regard
Kosovo as an anomaly rather than a precedent.
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate: NATO's Fiftieth
Anniversary Summit (Apr. 21, 1999).
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
61. See Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 826-27 (1999).
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The second post-Cold War shift in attitudes towards
regional organizations pertains almost exclusively to Africa,
where first the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and then the African Union (AU) have quietly
asserted a right to carry out enforcement actions without the
prior authorization of the UN Security Council. In 1990,
ECOWAS used force to end the civil war raging in Liberia; it
neither sought nor received prior Security Council
authorization. Other States generally welcomed, or at least
acquiesced in, ECOWAS' decision to use force, and in
subsequent resolutions, the Council implicitly supported the
intervention. 62  ECOWAS again used force without prior
Security Council authorization in 1996, this time to reinstate
the ousted President of Sierra Leone. 63 Again, the Security
Council implicitly ratified the intervention, but only after the
fact.64
In 1998, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol Relating to the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security. 65 The Protocol established a nine-
member Mediation and Security Council, empowered to decide
by a two-thirds vote on ECOWAS responses to conflicts in
member states.66 Among other things, the Mediation and
Security Council shall "decide on all matters relating to peace
and security"; and shall "authorise all forms of intervention and
decide particularly on the deployment of political and military
missions" 67 pursuant to triggering conditions that include
"serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of
law"; "an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically
elected government"; and "[a]ny other situation as may be
62. See Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in
International Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 347 (1998); David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace:
ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 185-86 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., Concil on
Foreign Relations Press 1993).
63. See Levitt, supra note 62, at 347; Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker,
The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the
ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 325-31 (1998).
64. See S.C. Res. 1181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l181 (July 13, 1998).
65. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, Dec. 10, 1999, available at
http://www.iss.co. za/af/regorg/unity-to-union/ pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf.
66. Id. art. 4, 8-10.
67. Id. art. 10.
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decided by the Mediation and Security Council."68 Member
states are to designate military units to be available to carry out
missions mandated by the Mediation and Security Council.6 9 In
short, ECOWAS has created a miniature, sub-regional
equivalent of the UN Security Council, and arrogated to itself
the power to undertake enforcement actions in member states.
In July 2000, the African Union followed suit, by including
in its Constitutive Act a provision asserting "the right of the
Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."70 In 2002, the
AU adopted a protocol establishing a Peace and Security
Council empowered to take decisions on intervention by a two-
thirds majority, and authorized the establishment of an African
Standby Force to help carry out peace support and intervention
missions.71
ECOWAS and AU claims of a right to intervene in grave
circumstances have garnered surprisingly little attention, in
part because most states would welcome any means to curtail
Africa's many festering conflicts and because the United
Nations has repeatedly proven unwilling to tackle such conflicts
itself. ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, and later Sierra Leone,
followed unsuccessful efforts to persuade the Security Council to
take meaningful action. So long as future actions by ECOWAS
and the AU fit that pattern, they are unlikely to attract much
criticism, even if they do not fit with the Charter scheme for the
use of force. In any event, given political and resource
constraints, neither ECOWAS nor the AU is likely to employ its
claimed mandate to intervene very often. And the ECOWAS
and AU models are unlikely to be replicated, or accepted,
elsewhere, so their impact on the Charter as a whole will likely
remain modest.
68. Id. art. 25.
69. Id. art. 28.
70. Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive-Act.en.htm.
71. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union, art. 13, July 9, 2002, available at http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War may have loosened generally the
political constraints on the use of force. NATO's intervention in
Kosovo and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 would have been
unthinkable during the Cold War. Similarly, the U.S. response
to the September 11 attacks could not have taken place in a
Cold War environment. Such actions are possible today because
the danger that competing interventions might escalate to a
superpower nuclear confrontation has largely disappeared.
Accordingly, NATO and the United States have space to act that
did not exist before. Similar space exists for other states that
might wish to use force on a limited scale, whether it takes the
form of Russian military action in the "near abroad" or the
multiple interventions of Uganda and Rwanda in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
But the flip side of this easing of constraint is the decline of
superpower interference in internal conflicts. During the Cold
War, both superpowers felt the need to discipline members of
their respective blocs. Such discipline, whether in U.S. efforts to
maintain friendly governments or overthrow unfriendly ones in
Latin America, or Soviet efforts under the so-called Brezhnev
Doctrine to retain communist regimes in eastern Europe
through force if necessary, posed an important challenge to
Article 2(4) that has now largely dissipated. Moreover,
competitive superpower interventions on behalf of national
liberation movements and "freedom fighters" throughout the
developing world, matched by opposing superpower support for
friendly governments, have largely ended. The end of the Cold
War also paved the way for at least occasional Security Council
cooperation on peace and security issues. Thus, even though
Article 2(4) faces new challenges, at least some old ones have
receded.
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